February 9, 2023
GARY ADSHEAD: There's so many questions out of this, it's not funny. But we know about it because Senator James Paterson, the federal Opposition's Cyber Security spokesperson, conducted his own audit around the notion of where these CCTV cameras come from and where they are feeding data to. He joins me on the line. Thanks very much for your time, Senator.
JAMES PATERSON: Thanks for having me, Gary.
ADSHEAD: What made you decide to look at the surveillance systems within government departments?
PATERSON: Well, in September last year, I was curious whether or not the Department of Home Affairs had any of these devices installed and whether or not they had any visibility of these devices being installed in other Commonwealth departments or agencies. They came back to me, and they said, yes, they had a couple installed in premises they occupied, but no, they didn't have any visibility whether or not any other Commonwealth departments and agencies had them. So given that no one in government knew, I thought I had to launch an audit of my own. And so, I submitted questions on notice through the Senate to every single
government department and agency. Those results six-months later have finally come back. And we now know, unfortunately, almost 1,000 different surveillance devices provided by Hikvision and Dahua, the two Chinese government linked surveillance companies, are riddled through a number of Commonwealth departments and agencies, including the Department of the Attorney-General, the Defence Department, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. They're national security related agencies where these devices have absolutely no business being installed.
ADSHEAD: What about in Parliament House?
PATERSON: Well in good news this afternoon, I've just been notified by the Department of Parliamentary Services that they do not have any of those devices in Parliament House. So that is a very welcome update.
ADSHEAD: Okay. So, to get an idea of where these surveillance cameras may be located, are we talking in the hallways, in the entrances or are we actually talking about inside the offices of some of those government departments.
PATERSON: To give some concrete examples, the Australian War Memorial has said that the cameras that they have installed from Hikvision are on the outside of the building, but that does allow them to record people coming and going and potentially, depending on the nature of those devices, some of them also capture audio as well. In other government departments, they haven't been as clear as to where exactly they are in their premises. Some have just said, don't worry, they're not in secure areas. But frankly, they shouldn't be anywhere near any Commonwealth department, not just because of the national security risk, but also because of the moral problem here. I mean, Hikvision and Dahua are involved and implicated directly in the mass surveillance of Uyghur people in Xinjiang and other ethnic minorities. They use their facial recognition technology to identify them. That is an oppression that has been labelled by the United Nations as potentially constituting a crime against humanity. Other people have said it might constitute a genocide. Australian taxpayers' money should not be going to companies involved in these reprehensible acts.
ADSHEAD: From your point of view, I mean, you obviously lived through the Huawei debates as well in terms of allowing that technology into our world. Can you just explain to me how the procurement process could possibly happen where someone didn't go, ah hold on a minute. You know, these guys are pretty well linked to the Chinese Communist Party. Maybe we better find a different brand.
PATERSON: Well, you're absolutely right to call out the example of Huawei because we should ban these for the same reason from Australian government sites as we ban Hauwei from 5G, 4G, and our NBN networks. And that is because they are close to the Chinese Communist Party, subject to China's intelligence laws, and that means they have to provide assistance to Chinese intelligence agencies, and they have to keep that assistance secret. So, we could never know how much information or what information they're handing over to
them. And it is frankly flabbergasting that someone in a department thought it was appropriate to purchase these. Maybe they were cheaper than the alternatives. Certainly, the Chinese government likes to subsidise their tech champions like these companies so they can outcompete others all around the world. But I think they should have thought about what the long-term cost and the long-term consequences would be of allowing these devices on sensitive government.
ADSHEAD: How out of interest are you surprised the speed of which the PM and the Defence Minister have reacted by saying we're going to remove them?
PATERSON: Look, I'm very pleased with their response. That's exactly the response I would hope I would get from any Australian government when these facts are brought to their attention. The Defence Minister has said that they'll be removing them from his properties and sites. That's good, I'd like to see all other ministers make the same commitment though. I want to get it out of all government agencies, not just Defence.
ADSHEAD: Okay. And obviously there's going to be a cost involved in this. I don't suppose you know what the unit's, each unit costs and how many sites they're across?
PATERSON: Whatever it costs, it's worth it. You can't put a price on our sovereignty on our democracy, on our freedom and on the privacy and security of the sensitive information that our government departments have access to.
ADSHEAD: I think the one that worries me, Senator, is when I see that, according to your audit, there's 195 units inside the Attorney-General's office, and then there's also, well, 28 sites in Foreign Affairs that have these particular Chinese-made spy vision, surveillance vision.
PATERSON: Well, exactly right, Gary. I mean, these are national security agencies. They should not have these cameras on their facilities. These are lead agencies which provide advice and assistance to other arms of the Commonwealth on national security. In a sense, you might forgive an agency less central to national security for having done this. But actually, the National Disability Insurance Agency, in their answer to me fessed up. They said, we've got these cameras, but we've got a plan to remove and replace them. Now, that's much more proactive, frankly, than some other government departments.
ADSHEAD: Okay. And from your point of view, obviously, you heard the PM say, well, they'll just have to suck it up. The Chinese, when this gets out that we're removing all these cameras, how do you think they'll react? I mean, we're sort of like two steps forward, one step back, aren't we, with Chinese diplomacy at the moment?
PATERSON: Certainly the Chinese government was very disappointed when we excluded Huawei and ZTE another similar company from the 5G network. But frankly, I would much rather they'd be a bit upset with us and that we secure our national security and our sovereignty. It is not worth appeasing them by sacrificing our security, our privacy, our safety.
ADSHEAD: All right. Well, it's quite extraordinary that we get to these situations, Senator, but I appreciate your joining us today.
PATERSON: Good on you Gary, thank you.
ENDS
