March 6, 2023
LAURA JAYES: Joining me live from Canberra is Shadow Cyber Security Minister James Paterson. James, thanks so much for your time. First of all, this wasn't information freely given. You had to ask questions through Senate estimates. Why is it so difficult to ascertain this information?
JAMES PATERSON: That's a really great question, Laura, and I wish I knew a good answer for that. I decided that this was public information that should be on the record. And so, I approached every government department and agency and asked them whether or not they permitted their employees to download TikTok on their work-issued devices. Twenty-five government departments said no, it was banned entirely, 12 of them said it was partially banned, so, for example, they can't download on their phone, but they can download it on their laptop. Eleven said it was permitted, there were no restrictions, and five haven't responded at all by the deadline or did not provide an answer in their response.
JAYES: Okay, so with the 25 agencies or departments that have banned TikTok, do you feel more reassured, more at ease?
PATERSON: It's certainly a good thing that departments like the Department of Defence and Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs and Trade and Prime Minister and Cabinet ban it. But I am concerned that the approach of the government is inconsistent and haphazard. If it's unsafe to be on the devices of some public servants, it's not clear to me why it's safe to be on the devices of other public servants, particularly in light, as you say, of the decision of the US government to ban it on all government devices. That's been matched by the Canadian government, the European Commission and by other countries like Denmark. I think Australia is falling behind here. I've been calling on the Albanese government for eight months to do something about this after TikTok admitted to me in a letter in July last year that Australian user data is accessible in mainland China. Ever since then I think there's been a compelling case to act. Unfortunately, we haven't seen any action from the government yet, but I hope that changes soon.
JAYES: Yeah, indeed. So, what is the next step in? Do you think the government should put in place a review? Should they do an audit of its own? Start with all government agencies, which means, you know, all public servants as well, and then look beyond that?
PATERSON: My understanding is that the Minister for Home Affairs and Cyber Security, Clare O'Neil, has already asked her department for advice about this, about those security risks and about the policy options. And I would just encourage the government to act on that as soon as possible, particularly in relation to government-issued devices. We should not fall behind our friends and allies. We could have led the world like we did with Huawei in 2018, and our judgement on that issue has been backed by many other countries following us. But at the very least, we shouldn't fall any further behind when it comes to government devices. As to the wider question about the millions of Australians who use these applications. Well, we've launched a Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media, and we'll be conducting hearings in the next few months and we hope to be able to provide the government with some concrete policy suggestions about the wider issues relating to a whole range of apps, not just TikTok, but WeChat and others as well.
JAYES: Okay. So, you talk about the risks. What is the risk of using TikTok if you are working for a government agency?
PATERSON: Well, unfortunately, we have a very good case study, a smoking gun I would say, which is a journalist who is working on TikTok, writing critical stories about them for Forbes, alleged last year that she had been surveilled by the application and when that allegation was made public, TikTok said not only had they not done so, but that it was not even technically possible for them to do so using the application. They were forced to admit a couple of months later that that in fact was not true, that they had tried to spy on this journalist to identify her sources, and that two employees in
America and two employees in China had been fired for doing so. So that demonstrates that TikTok does use the app to spy on people and that they're willing to lie about it publicly. Now, ever since those revelations...
JAYES: How do they do it? Does your phone become a listening device through TikTok? How do they actually surveil?
PATERSON: So independent cybersecurity analysts like Internet 2.0 have demonstrated that TikTok collects an unusually large amount of information on its users, and one of the pieces of information that it collects is your physical location. And what TikTok was trying to do was co-locate this particular journalist with TikTok employees to try and identify if there were any sources within the company who are leaking information to her, which allowed her to write these critical articles. Now, that just shows the power of applications. TikTok on your phone checks your device's location. It asks you for your contacts. It maps all the other applications installed in your phone. It checks the Wi-Fi networks you've logged into. And if you use the in-app browser on TikTok to look at other websites, it has the power to record every single keystroke that you enter. That could include passwords to websites that could include your credit card information. This is an application that stores an enormous amount of data. It's a company which is very close to the Chinese Communist Party, and like all large companies in China, it's subject to China's National Intelligence law, which requires it to hand over information to Chinese intelligence agencies if requested. And that means we would never know if the information on Australian users whether a government bureaucrat or private citizen is being handed over to the Chinese Communist Party.
JAYES: Well, okay, so these individual breaches alone, we might think oh, that's not a big deal, checking my keystrokes, but if you add all these things up together, I mean, this app could essentially collect almost everything about you, everything you do online they can collect.
PATERSON: That's right, Laura. And the foreign interference risk is very high, too. TikTok has been demonstrated in the past to be a platform which is very permissive for foreign state disinformation. Foreign state activists and advocates who have tried to obscure their links to foreign governments have been remarkably successful in seeding disinformation on the TikTok platform and effectively pumping it to millions of citizens in the Western world. Because TikTok only operates in Western countries, it has a sister app which operates within the borders of China.
JAYES: Yeah, that's right, so it doesn't even operate in China, does it? Because that would be too democratic, I think. But we're running out of time rapidly. I just want to quickly ask you this. Do you think there is a chance because, you know, TikTok, I'm
not on it, but TikTok seems to have thousands more views than it does on Instagram, for example. Do you think that might be a device used by TikTok in order to, you know, pump up the views? So essentially people go to TikTok if it's, you know, to make money or build an audience. Do you think that might be artificial and part of the plan?
PATERSON: That's a good question, Laura. And the truth is, we don't know. TikTok is not a transparent company. They do not share information about how they operate, and particularly the algorithm which is human-assisted and directed. And so the content that they are choosing to promote to you or me or the person sitting next to us on a bus, we have absolutely no idea. And that is one of the frightening things about this app. They could be using it, for example, to reduce critical information of the Chinese Communist Party and elevate narratives that are harmful and damaging and divisive in our societies. And I think we have to take this threat very seriously.
JAYES: Yeah, that's why you got to be careful where you get your news from as well. James Paterson, thanks so much for your time. We'll speak soon.
PATERSON: Thanks, Laura.
ENDS
