December 20, 2022
LIKE the rest of the world, the pandemic saw even more Australians turn to technology to manage their financial and social wellbeing. In particular, social media helped us connect with loved ones we were prevented from seeing, build our businesses and keep abreast of news and trends.
Australians are prolific users of social media such as Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, WeChat and TikTok. By the end of 2021, social media management platforms Hootsuite and We Are Social estimated there were 21 million social media users in Australia.
Despite all the benefits social media has enabled, it comes with unique risks not just to the individual but also to Australia’s security.
Australians should expect their leaders to be honest about what these risks are and how we are placed to respond.
In other democratic societies we have observed foreign interference through social media perpetrated by authoritarian regimes seeking to harm and divide them.
Public inquiries into the conduct of the 2016 US presidential election and the 2019 British general election showed some of the ways foreign state actors, or state-backed actors, can use social media to interfere with democratic discourse and election processes.
Australia is not immune.
A 2019 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that of 97 national elections around the world, 20 countries, Australia included, showed clear examples of cyber-enabled foreign interference, primarily perpetrated by Russia and China.
More recently we have learnt of the excessive data harvesting practices of TikTok, a viral video app whose parent company ByteDance is based in China.
An analysis by cybersecurity and intelligence firm Internet 2.0 discovered TikTok checked device location every hour, continuously requested access to contacts even if the user originally denied, mapped a device’s running and installed apps, and could record users’ keystrokes.
It followed an admission by TikTok that Australian user data could be accessed in China. Because of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, ByteDance employees may be required to secretly co-operate with Chinese intelligence agencies.
With about seven million Australian TikTok users each spending on average 23 hours a month on the platform, the risk of user data being weaponised against us is real.
That’s just one reason why the re-established Senate inquiry into foreign interference through social media is so important. This inquiry will build on the work in this area already undertaken by the committee in the previous parliament.
The weaponisation of Western social media platforms by foreign authoritarian regimes seeking to confuse, hurt and divide liberal democracies is a serious threat that must also be countered.
It’s not a new threat but an escalating and evolving one that needs to be viewed within the broader context of Australia’s deteriorating security environment.
According to our intelligence and security agencies, foreign interference has surpassed terrorism as Australia’s principal security concern, and is assessed to be even more intense than at the height of the Cold War. China is the most serious, persistent offender.
The Chinese government remains engaged in the fastest military build-up since World War II and has shown its willingness to deploy all means of state power to advance its national objectives. Cyber-enabled foreign interference is just one tool of many grey-zone tactics used by authoritarian regimes to weaken their opponents.
Russia’s hybrid war on Ukraine has shown how cyber can be an influential component of modern conflict. In war, and as a precursor to war, we are increasingly seeing signs of social media as an instrument for misinformation and disinformation to sow fear, confusion, division and hatred.
Russia not only targeted Ukraine, but also its democratic allies through social media, attempting to undermine Western support for the Zelensky government in a transparent attempt to cut off its supply of military aid.
With the rising risk of state-on-state conflict in our own region, we cannot allow foreign authoritarian governments to retain unregulated access to our data and our citizens, otherwise we are providing them with a powerful vector to undermine our social cohesion, national morale and sense of unity at a time of crisis.
In government, the Coalition combated foreign interference and hardened our systems from cyber attacks. Many of these reforms are now being copied elsewhere.
But an evolving threat requires an adaptive response, so there is more work to do.
As the newly elected chairman, I am determined to ensure all legislative options are on the table when responding to the risks associated with social media apps headquartered in foreign authoritarian regimes.
The committee will also consider all options to ensure Western social media companies do more to prevent their platforms being hijacked by authoritarian regimes to interfere in our democratic processes.
If we fail to act when we can, we regret it when it’s too late.
SENATOR JAMES PATERSON IS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTERFERENCE THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA. SUBMISSIONS TO THE INQUIRY SHOULD BE LODGED BY FEBRUARY 17, 2023
