March 6, 2023
JAMES PATERSON: Well, good morning. Thank you for coming. Today I have released an audit of every federal government department and agency and whether or not they permit their employees to download the application TikTok from work-issued devices. The results are that 25 government departments and agencies ban it entirely. Twelve ban it partially, for example by permitting it on phones but not on laptops. Eleven permit it, and five government departments either didn't respond at all or didn't answer clearly in their response.
This is a haphazard and inconsistent approach from the Albanese government, and we need clear action from them on this issue. For eight months now, since July last year, I've been calling on them to act to protect Australians from the serious national security risks posed by TikTok. Had they acted then, Australia could have led the world like we did with Huawei when we banned it in 2018, a decision which has been vindicated by many other countries following our lead. But since then, no action has been taken by the Albanese government and many other countries are stepping forward and taking action.
The United States, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark and others have acted to ban this application from government-issued devices. The question that the Albanese government and the Minister for Home Affairs and Cyber Security, Clare O'Neil, has to answer is if it's not safe to be on the phone of a Canadian or American or a European bureaucrat, why is it safe to be on the phone of an Australian government bureaucrat? Happy to take questions.
QUESTION: What evidence do you have that TikTok is posing a risk to our national security?
PATERSON: Well, the first piece of evidence is that our closest allies and friends are acting to protect themselves from this threat. But we also now have a smoking gun. Last year, a journalist at Forbes who had written critical articles on TikTok alleged that she had been surveilled using the application on her phone. When she made those allegations TikTok denied it. They said not only were they not doing it, but it wasn't even technically possible for them to do it. But in December, they had to admit that in fact that was wrong, that they had been surveilling her and they had to fire two employees in the United States and two employees in China who had been tracking this journalist and trying to identify that journalist’s sources. So, if they can do it to a journalist, they can do it to a public servant or bureaucrats. I don't think that's a risk we should tolerate.
QUESTION: On the Chinese influence, we've heard that they've approach pilots in different allies' countries, Richard Marles has [indistinct] doesn't make it public how many people they've approach. Clare O'Neil has said we need to shine a light on foreign interference. What's your take on shining a light and being more transparent about China's attack on our democracy?
PATERSON: I certainly welcome the intent from the government to speak more openly about foreign interference. I think that is important. I think ASIO has led the way with Mike Burgess' annual threat assessments where he's very frank about this. But the truth is we have to be open and honest about these threats, no matter where they come from, from all countries. It's quite easy, frankly, to talk about Iranian foreign interference and threats. It's much more difficult and much more sensitive for the government to talk about threats from China, which is a much larger trading partner. And they're obviously trying to repair the bilateral relationship. I want them to be honest about all the threats. I think we all know that overwhelmingly those threats come from China. So, I don't give the government a lot of points talking about Iranian or North Korean, Venezuelan foreign interference when we all know that the major source is from China.
QUESTION: With the military build-up in China, are you worried that that's going to lead to more cyberattacks, and more espionage activity against Australia?
PATERSON: China has again confirmed in its publicly released statistics, that it is significantly increasing its expenditure on defence as it did in the previous financial year as well, far ahead of their expected GDP growth. That is one of the major events which is shaping geopolitics in our region. We need to take it very seriously. A more capable Chinese Communist Party is a greater potential threat to our region and that's why we need AUKUS and other strong responses.
QUESTION: Just on last week, you weren't privy to the advice of Jim Chalmers, that was a few days ago now, that the government would need a good reason not to ban these devices. Have you had interaction with the government?
PATERSON: No, I haven't, and it's really important that the government doesn't hide behind our intelligence agencies on this issue. Our intelligence agencies are highly competent and highly sophisticated in the advice they provide. But it's not up for them to make a policy decision. They provide advice about technical issues. They can tell the government whether this is a risk or not a risk. It's up to the government to act on it. And I now think it's completely clear with all our friends and allies acting in unison on this issue that this is a very serious threat, and we need to address it.
QUESTION: Just on TikTok as well, is there room for nuance in this debate in terms of a ban on all agencies. Obviously, some agencies like the National Gallery and Tourism Australia have said they use if for marketing and outreach purposes? Do you think there's still a risk there?
PATERSON: I think some exceptions could be granted in exceptional circumstances. It doesn't have to be a government-wide ban, but at the moment there's no clear direction centrally from government. It appears that individual departments and agencies are making their own decisions about that and it's not clear that that's informed by the best advice and that they are considering that advice.
QUESTION: Senator, you said that 25 agencies are banned entirely and 12 partially. Is that more than at the time of the change of government?
PATERSON: I don't know. I've only asked these questions now that I've got the opportunity to as the Shadow Minister for Cyber Security. This has never been previously asked or publicised. I'd like to see an increasing number of agencies ban it. All I can point to from the Questions on Notice is that one government department,
the CSIRO, said in response to my Question on Notice that they were intending on banning it. I think that's very welcome. An organisation like CSIRO does have very sensitive both commercially and otherwise information and it's welcome that in response to my question, they're acting on it.
QUESTION: Well, why didn't your government take more action on this? It seems like after the fact you're calling on the government to do it when your government could have taken stronger action.
PATERSON: Well, there's been two key developments since the election. The first was in July last year when I wrote to TikTok and I asked them, do you allow Australian user data to be accessed in China, and they acknowledged in their reply to me that they did. That was the first time the company had ever admitted publicly that that happens. And the second development was the one I referred to before with their admission that they're using the application to surveil journalists. Those things have happened on this government's watch, as has the action by our allies, to ban this app. So, it really falls to the government to act.
QUESTION: Presumably the countries like the States and Canada that have already banned this, you're aware with Five Eyes countries that we'd be sharing information with them. Is it possible that if we're not following in their footsteps, that it's because the intelligence, or the evidence isn't really there, and this is actually more of a cautionary measure than there being direct proof of this being an issue?
PATERSON: Look, only the government can answer that question, and only the government can provide the information required. But there have been increasing warnings about this application in recent months. For example, after I raised the issue with them in Senate estimates, the Department of Parliamentary Services sent an advisory to all APH users and said that there are risks from applications like TikTok and that users should exercise caution. It's also been previously publicly reported that ASD has advised parliamentarians that they should have a second device for social media applications like TikTok because of the risks that are posed. I don't think anyone is seriously arguing there are no serious risks with this application. It's up to the government to act on them.
QUESTION: You mentioned earlier today as well that you're aware that Home Affairs Minister Clare O'Neil has asked her department for advice on TikTok and I guess social media in general. Can you just shed a little bit more detail on that? And also, what would you expect Clare O'Neil to do in response to some of this advice?
PATERSON: Well, the Minister has publicly announced that she sought advice from her department which I understand relates to the risks posed by TikTok, but also the policy options for dealing with it. And frankly, not just TikTok but other social media platforms that are headquartered in authoritarian states. WeChat is another example, it has a significant number of Australian users and also poses risks. Those wider policy questions about what to do to protect the millions of Australians who are exposed to these applications is something that I intend to take up as Chair of the Senate Select Committee into Foreign Interference Through Social Media this year and I hope that in a bipartisan fashion we can provide advice to government about policy options for dealing with this. But in the meantime, action is necessary to protect government users because they are a serious risk.
QUESTION: You talked about the different departments and who does and doesn't allow TikTok. What about politicians? What do you think the policy should be there?
PATERSON: So, it's already clear advice to politicians that they shouldn't have TikTok on their work-issued devices. It shouldn't be on your phone that you use for emails and other things. I think it's an individual judgement for members of parliament if they want to use it, but they should be doing it on a discrete device that does not intermingle with their other applications.
QUESTION: Can I just follow on from Claire's question about the Five Eyes advice, if the other countries have taken a precautionary measure and there's no advice to ban it at the moment. We're trying to repair our relationship with China. We saw that after the Huawei stuff it did sour. Given that, shouldn't we hold off on anything until we have concrete evidence, so we don't sabotage that repair or that thaw before we have anything tangible?
PATERSON: My view is that we should always act in the national interest and we should never tolerate unacceptable national security risks for the sake of the bilateral relationship. The previous government certainly did do that in relation to things like Huawei, and that judgement has been vindicated because we were the first to act and others have followed. And I hope the government is not tolerating unacceptable national security risks for the sake of bilateral relations.
QUESTION: Should the PJCIS look more closely at right wing terrorist organisations than Islamist terrorist organisations. We heard at Senate Estimates that there's a big discrepancy between the threat coming from right wing organisations and how many are actually listed on our register?
PATERSON: I thought it very interesting in Mike Burgess's testimony to the Senate that he revealed that the threat of right-wing extremism has subsided in recent months, close to the end of the public health measures in relation to the pandemic. That's a positive thing. We hope that the threat of all terrorism decreases, but it was Mike Burgess' advice that religiously motivated terrorism is the, again, very clear primary threat which is consistent with the advice that the AFP has provided. It is not up to the PJCIS to initiate a listing of a terrorist organisation. Only the Minister for Home Affairs can do that. The PJCIS has to then review that listing and I know that the committee would be happy to do so if the government tries to do so.
QUESTION: Just on that, what's your view of the binary sort of ideologically motivated and religiously motivated, you know the PJCIS has had submissions that calling something like ISIS actually has the double-edged sword of, you know, sort of painting all Muslims with the same brush, but also feeds into these right-wing narratives. Do you think that there should be more nuance in the way that terror groups are categorised?
PATERSON: I support the ASIO language here, which is to use a broad umbrella categories like ideologically and religiously motivated terrorism, but also to speak directly about the groups within those categories and how they relate to it. So, if they are an Islamist motivated group, we should say so. If they are a white supremacist group or neo-Nazi group, we should say so. But I think those broad categories are helpful because many of these groups defy easy categorisation. They don't fit on the left-right spectrum, for example, and I think it's appropriate.
QUESTION: Senator, what policy options would you consider advocated as Chair of the committee. Is a ban across all Australians' devices an open option, would you consider stronger privacy laws, what's on and off the table?
PATERSON: Look, I think every option at this stage has to be on the table, including, if absolutely necessary, banning applications that pose an unacceptable national security risk. I hope those national security risks can be mitigated with less intrusive decisions. But if they can't, I think we have to consider all options.
Thanks, everyone. Cheers.
ENDS
