July 12, 2023
WARWICK LONG: Senator James Paterson is the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs and Cyber Security, Chair of the Select Committee investigating foreign interference through social media. I spoke to him a short time ago and asked about the committee and what it's hoping to achieve and what he wants you to do with your phone.
JAMES PATERSON: So the Senate established by unanimous resolution last year a Senate Select Committee into Foreign Interference through Social Media. And it's looking at two principle but closely related problems. The first is the way in which Western headquartered social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others, are being successfully weaponised by foreign authoritarian states who seek to pump disinformation into our democracies through these platforms. And they often do it through inauthentic accounts and trying to game the algorithms. The second and even more troubling problem the committee is looking at, which is a related one, is the social media platforms who are themselves already headquartered in authoritarian states and therefore subject to much more direct control of those states, and you don't need to try and pump them full of disinformation in the same way of artificially gaming their algorithms because they can direct them and control them. And that includes companies like TikTok and WeChat. In the case of TikTok, a company which is a social media app which is very popular with many young people who are increasingly sourcing their news about the world from it. In the case of WeChat, one which is very popular with diaspora communities over which it has a lot of influence.
LONG: And what are your concerns about their operations, as you say, in terms of influencing our democracy? What are the specific concerns there?
PATERSON: There are two national security problems posed by these apps. The first is the amount of data that they collect on us and how it could fall into the hands of a foreign authoritarian government. In the case of both TikTok and WeChat they collect a lot of data on their users, including access to your contact book, to your other apps on your phone, including your emails, your calendars, your face print, your voice print, your WiFi networks you have logged into. Extraordinarily rich datasets on individual users. And because of the intelligence laws of China and because the employees of these companies work there and can access your data, there is no guarantee that these companies can make that your data won't be handed over to an intelligence agency in China and used against you. Secondly, we're concerned that they will facilitate the elevation of disinformation in our democracy, both by supporting narratives that are supportive of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, saying that there's nothing going on in Hong Kong, that there's nothing to worry about in Xinjiang, and suppressing narratives that are critical of those those movements of those events, and also just elevating content which is divisive in nature and inside Western democracies. We know that it has been an objective of authoritarian states, not just China, but Russia included, to divide democratic societies internally because they think we're weaker when we're divided and we can't respond as effectively to their provocations.
LONG: Is it right to compare China's disinformation to Russia's disinformation campaigns?
PATERSON: Yes, they're remarkably similar and they learn from each other and they are showing evidence of evolution. In fact, Meta, the parent company of Facebook appeared before the committee yesterday, talked about how some of the China-originating disinformation campaigns have evolved to become more sophisticated. And it looks in many ways like they are trying to ape or copy some earlier disinformation campaigns that Russian state sponsored actors engaged in.
LONG: You've been trying hard to get the operators of these apps to appear at your Senate inquiry. Have you had much success?
PATERSON: I've had success with all of the social media platforms who have a legal or physical presence in Australia because they had to ultimately comply, because I have the power in the Senate to compel them to appear if they refuse to do so. I haven't had any success in the case of WeChat, which doesn't have a legal or physical or personal presence here in Australia and so I couldn't compel them to appear...
LONG: So there is no WeChat staff member in Australia?
PATERSON: No, there are no WeChat employees at all in Australia, and that's quite a big problem because they've got up to a million users in Australia but no proper democratic
oversight of their activities in Australia. So they decided, even though they were invited to appear by the committee secretariat three times, and even though I wrote to them directly on top of that, personally appealing for them to appear, that they didn't want to cooperate with the committee, that they didn't want to participate in our inquiry that they didn't want to answer our questions. And really, frankly, I think that shows contempt for the Parliament of Australia and raises very real questions about their willingness to comply with Australian law as well.
LONG: Should Australian government members or should Australians themselves be reconsidering whether they have WeChat or other apps like this on their phones?
PATERSON: I would urge all Australians to think very carefully about whether you need to use these apps and whether or not the risks that they pose to you personally and our society more broadly is a risk that's worth taking. In the case of the government, they have already banned TikTok from all government devices and there's only very limited exceptions. And in those limited exceptions it has to be a secure device that is not used for any other purpose which must be stored securely and must not hold any other information. Now, it's obviously not practical for the six to seven million Australian users of TikTok to have a second device to do that. And so they should really think about whether or not they're willing to bear that risk, given that the mitigation is not realistic for them to do.
LONG: How big is that risk to regular Australians?
PATERSON: Well it's a very heightened risk if you are in any way adjacent to or involved in politics, journalism, activism or research. I mean, we do know that in the United States and Europe that TikTok was busted having used their app to spy on two journalists to try to identify their sources. Now, that's something that they denied that they did. And they also even said it wasn't technically possible to do with the app, but the subsequently had to admit, in fact, they had done so. Now, that is a risk that every single Australian who uses the app is exposed to simply by downloading and installing the app on your phone you open yourself up to that same risk. So while you might not be of a high level of interest to a Chinese intelligence agency right now, you never know in the future, depending on what career path you take or who you become involved with socially or in a friendship basis that you might become a person of interest. And of course, all of us are exposed to having our data collected on a mass scale.
LONG: And just in terms of the wider picture here and your calls here, there has been a period of improving relations with China for Australia. Since then we've seen warrants issued on people living in Australia. Some of the challenges from your Senate inquiry to Chinese owned and operated social media apps as well. And now China has delayed some of its actions to cool the barley trade, for example, as well for Australian farmers. Are things turning more sour with China again?
PATERSON: The China bilateral relationship is a very important one, but it's also a very complex one and I don't think we can ever rely on it being a normal bilateral relationship like
our relationships are with other democracies because it's a very fundamentally different political system. Their political system is a matter for them, and our political system is a matter for us. But what we've seen in the bilateral relationship with China is that the Chinese government has often sought to impose its values and its political system on ours. When they released a couple of years ago, the infamous list of 14 demands for Australia, which they said were a precondition to resolving the trade sanctions, they went to things like the freedom of speech of members of Parliament or the press or academic or think tanks to engage in criticism of China's human rights record, or their interference in our democracy, or indeed our right to review foreign investment proposals stemming from China. Now, none of those things are the kind of things that any Australian government could compromise on. And if we're not willing to compromise on them, then we're going to have to accept that the bilateral relationship is going to have tensions in the future. And your examples of the bounties issued on the heads of an Australian citizen, and an Australian resident for legitimate free speech and political activism in Australia is just yet more evidence of that discontinuity, that problem in the relationship that no matter who is in charge in at the political level in Australia is always going to exist.
LONG: Is that something you have to consider then when you're leading a Senate inquiry? When you make calls or claims like you have public about Chinese operated apps not cooperating?
PATERSON: I do think very carefully about the implications for the work that I do on the bilateral relationship, because it's important. But equally, I'm very clear that Australia and individual parliamentarians in Australia should never compromise our national interest or our national security in the pursuit of a bilateral relationship. Any bilateral relationship with any partner is a means to an end. It is not an end in itself. And that means that we should trying to secure is the prosperity, security and sovereignty of Australia, and we should never accept a transgression on any of those things, particularly our sovereignty and our security, so that we can have a less complicated or easy bilateral relationship with a foreign government.
LONG: What's the timeline from here for the Senate inquiry?
PATERSON: We are dure to report back to the Parliament by early August. I hope we can bring some really concrete suggestions and recommendations that the government can quickly implement.
LONG: Senator, it's been great to talk to you. Thanks very much for joining us on the program.
PATERSON: Thanks for having me.
ENDS
