September 11, 2023
GREG JENNETT: Well, a major story broke in the UK in recent days, confirming long held suspicions that Chinese operatives had successfully penetrated elements of the British parliament or government. London Metropolitan Police have confirmed a man in his twenties and another in his thirties were arrested back in March. Under the Official Secrets Act and they are both on bail until next month. This was enough to prompt British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to raise the matter with his Chinese counterpart, Premier Li, on the sidelines of the G20 in India over the weekend. Opposition frontbencher and member of Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee, James Paterson, has been keeping an eye on these developments. He joined us here straight after Question Time. James Paterson, welcome back to Afternoon Briefing always good to have you with us. Do you have Any reason to suspect that Chinese agents of influence are operating within the Parliament of Australia? Not perhaps as elected representatives, but as staff to employees or the Parliament itself.
JAMES PATERSON: It wouldn't be responsible for me to publicly speculate about whether that's the case or not. All I can point to is that ASIO has assessed that foreign interference and espionage is our number one national security risk and we now know, courtesy of revelations in the United Kingdom, that there is an alleged Chinese spy who had been working for a UK parliamentarian. And we know that if the Chinese Communist Party is attempting to do so there, it's likely that they have attempted to do so here. What we can't say for sure is whether or not they've been successful.
JENNETT: You know enough about the UK system, I suppose, to speculate on how authorities came to be aware. What do you understand of that and how it might differ from the work that ASIO does in this country?
PATERSON: The work that ASIO does is very similar to the work that our partners in the United Kingdom does, whether it's in MI5 or the Metropolitan Police, and they come across people who engage in these sorts of activities by a range of different sources and methods that can include electronic surveillance, it could include a human source, it could include a tip off and I don't know how it was that I came across this alleged spy in this instance. But what we do know is that this person was successfully hired working for parliamentarians who were focussed on and concerned about the issues relating to China. And that's a disturbing development.
JENNETT: And so in the UK context, would that raise any suggestion that they had been security vetted before their employment in whatever capacity this was?
PATERSON: My understanding it's the way it works in the UK system is to work in the Parliament. You need a very basic kind of vetting to have a pass to the building, but they are not security vetted or cleared in the same way that political staff in Australia are not necessarily vetted or cleared in the Australian system. It's only ministerial staff that must be, and that level of vetting depends on the kind of access to information they have and who they work for. But if you're a government backbencher, if you're in opposition, whether you're a frontbencher or a backbencher, none of our staff are cleared and that includes members of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security.
JENNETT: Why is that insufficient?
PATERSON: Well, in this day and age, where we know that espionage and foreign interference, our number one risk, if a foreign intelligence service can't compromise a member of Parliament, the next thing they'll try and do is target people close to that member of parliament that could include their staff or others in their remit. And if they're able to compromise someone, then they could have access to a steady flow of information which is useful. And they may also have the opportunity to disrupt the normal activities of the Australian Parliament. Consensus building on a piece of legislation, for example, could be disrupted by a very effective agent of a foreign power working for a parliamentarian.
JENNETT: If these operations, indeed these agents are effective, savvy, sophisticated. Isn't it naive to think that any vetting regime would identify them, red flagged them in some way?
PATERSON: Vetting is absolutely not a panacea. It's not a perfect protection, but it does go and it has been set up for exactly this purpose. The purpose of it is to identify people who might have already been compromised or who are susceptible to compromise, extortion and other kind of leverage so that we reduce the risk and we use it to make sure that people we employ in our intelligence agencies are uncompromised. We can use the same tools, the same techniques, the same tactics to limit the risk, but not eliminate it for parliamentarians.
JENNETT: The difference being that in the ministerial wing or across the lake at the ASIO headquarters, people are dealing with classified documents. That's not the case, though widely in committees or on backbench or opposition staffs in in this building. Is it so? Have authorities ever raised with you the concept of expanding vetting requirements here?
PATERSON: You're absolutely right. It is the access to classified material, which is of the greatest danger. But actually foreign intelligence agencies are interested in a whole range of information about our political system, much of which is not classified in nature, but is otherwise non-transparent or non-public. And that could relate to the views of a parliamentarian or the relationships they have with the other parliamentarians or issues that they're working on and planning to bring forward, much of which is not classified but is highly sensitive and attractive and interesting to a foreign intelligence agency. So, yes, I have had those conversations over time with our intelligence community. It's up to them to speak for themselves about whether or not they think that's appropriate. But I think it is now necessary. At the very least, if you're sitting on a sensitive committee. I mean, the parliament is about to establish a new committee, a statutory defence committee, which will oversee the implementation of AUKUS. Now there is no more attractive intelligence collection target than the secrets associated with AUKUS. And the parliamentarians who serve on that committee are going to deal with that sensitive information. And by extension, this staff will have opportunities to try and access that information. We must ensure that they are protected.
JENNETT: Yeah, that was going to be my next question. James Paterson of the two committees, one hasn't been established. Yet, but the AUKUS one will be is it in some senses more security conscious or might it need to be than the one you currently serve on?
PATERSON: Oh look, I think both are very important. But yes, I agree. In the current strategic environment, there's nothing more attractive than the secrets of AUKUS, whether that's the pillar one submarine technology, which we know is one of the most exquisite military technologies available in the world, or all of the high potential pillar two activities, including quantum and AI and cyber security and hypersonics. I mean, those are things that are high on the collection list of foreign intelligence agencies, and we should make it as hard as possible for them to get access to any of it.
JENNETT: Well, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link. And in AUKUS, there are three partners. I mean, should this be something that the three nations themselves tackle? A new security protocol about what you rightly identify as highly sensitive nuclear secrets that are going to be distributed over networks crisscrossing the world? Is this, in a sense, beyond Australia's remit alone?
PATERSON: It's absolutely a shared global problem, and for years, the Five Eyes intelligence agencies have been working together on a way in which we can mutually recognise the security clearances that we grant our own staff so that they can flow seamlessly between the intelligence community of the Five Eyes nations and work together on joint projects and initiatives. We have to have that mutual assurance that we recognise the way in which you vet your people and likewise, so that that can be seamless. It's even more important in that AUKUS context with only those three nations because it's even more sensitive what they're dealing with.
JENNETT: So what are we talking about there? If that model were to be developed? This would be a new set of understandings, would it? Between all three nations about what I imagine is a very large number of people privy to those secrets?
PATERSON: Well, there's three things we need for AUKUS to be a success. Three barriers that we need to remove. One is the regulatory barriers to the sharing of information. One is the barriers to the movement of people and the other as a barriers to the movement of capital. If you're not able to demolish all of those barriers, then AUKUS won't achieve its full potential and won't be as effective as it can. And the seamless movement of people is going to involve that mutual recognition of standards and vetting and assurance. And I want that to be able to happen seamlessly. We want the smartest people in Australia working those problems to be able to go to America and vice versa and to the United Kingdom as well. We don't want any obstacles in that pathway.
JENNETT: Well, you'd like to think that that is already a work in progress. Perhaps you would know. We certainly don't. That's the nature of these things. James Patterson, thanks so much for joining us today.
PATERSON: Thank you.
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